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ABSTRACT
Social media posts and photographs are increasingly denied
admission as evidence in criminal trials. Courts often cite issues
with authentication when refusing to admit social media
evidence. Cases and academic writings separate recent case law
into two approaches: The Maryland Approach and the Texas
Approach. The first method is often seen as overly skeptical of
social media evidence, setting the bar too high for admissibility.
The second approach is viewed as more lenient, declaring that
any reasonable evidence should be admitted in order for a jury
to weigh its sufficiency. This Brief addresses the supposed
differences between the two sets of cases and suggests that
courts are not actually employing two distinct approaches. The
Maryland Approach courts are not holding social media content
to a higher standard than the Texas Approach courts, but are
merely responding to a lack of evidence connecting the proffered
content to the purported author.

INTRODUCTION
Sarah and Megan, both thirteen years old, had been friends for
most of their lives. They went to the same school, were always spending
time at the other’s house, and even traveled with each other’s family for
vacations. As sometimes happens when getting older, however, Megan
transferred from the public school to a Catholic school and the two girls
had a “falling out.” Sometime thereafter, Sarah became worried that
Megan might be spreading rumors about her old friend to her new social
group. Sarah’s mother shared her daughter’s concerns, and conceived of
a scheme to humiliate Megan.
Sarah’s mother set up a fictitious MySpace account under the
name “Josh Evans.” “Josh” was sixteen years old, attractive, and new to
the neighborhood. She then used the new account to draw Megan into
conversation online. About two weeks later, Sarah’s mother had Josh tell
Megan that he no longer liked her and that the world would be a better
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place without Megan in it. Distraught, the thirteen-year-old hung herself
in her bedroom closet that night.1
The circumstances leading to Megan’s death demonstrate the
relative ease with which anyone can create a fictional persona online,
sometimes with horrific consequences. In the world of social media, it is
particularly easy for users to create fake accounts, access and manipulate
another’s account, and then change or delete the material at a later date.
The electronic nature of social media evidence presents many new legal
challenges, leaving case law regarding this type of evidence murky at
best. The requirement of authentication is therefore especially vital for
social media evidence to ensure that the offered material is what it
appears to be. The proponent should not only offer evidence that the
printout accurately reflects the online webpage, but also that it was
created by the purported author. Only then can the evidence be properly
presented to a jury.

I. THE PREVALENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Social media is defined as “forms of electronic communications
. . . through which users create online communities to share information,
ideas, personal messages, and other content.” 2 Social media sites are
“sophisticated tools of communication where the user voluntarily
provides information that the user wants to share with others.”3 These
web-based applications allow users to create a personal profile, often
containing a photograph of the user along with name, location, and the
ability to “post” statements for others to view.4 Social network sites
range from social communities such as Facebook and MySpace to the
professional network LinkedIn.5
The popularity of social media sites cannot be overstated. As one
District Judge and legal scholar wrote: “Social media is ubiquitous, and it

1

All background information comes from United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D.
449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
2
Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/
dictionary/social%20media (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
3
Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 437 n.3 (Md. 2009).
4
Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 685 (Del. 2014).
5
U.S. JUD. CONF. COMM. ON CODES OF CONDUCT, RESOURCE
PACKET FOR DEVELOPING GUIDELINES ON USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA BY JUDICIAL
EMPLOYEES 9 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
conduct/SocialMediaLayout.pdf.
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is here to stay.”6 At the beginning of 2014, eighty-nine percent of 18-29
year olds with Internet access used social networking sites.7 Facebook
boasts 1.35 billion monthly active users as of September 30, 2014.8 This
equates to one out of every 5.5 people in the world.9 The influential
website has become a constant in many users’ lives, with sixty-three
percent of users reportedly accessing the site at least once a day.10
Given the great prevalence of social media today, it is not
surprising that online content has made its way into courtrooms. After
creating a profile, users will frequently post items such as text, pictures,
or videos to their profile page. Often, these posts include relevant
evidence for a trial.11 Social media is offered in trials to show, among
other things, a party’s state of mind, intent, or motives.12 Parties may
wish to submit social media as evidence of communication between
users, inculpatory or exculpatory photographs, or even party
admissions. 13 Attorneys and judges are dealing with social media
evidence more and more as the Internet and technology continue to
advance.

II. DETERMINING AUTHENTICITY OF EVIDENCE IN GENERAL
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[R]elevant evidence is
admissible” unless otherwise provided and “[i]rrelevant evidence is not
admissible.” 14 This seemingly straightforward rule is complicated by
subsequent limitations on what qualifies as “relevant.” At the most basic
level, a party who wishes to admit evidence must first ask, “Does this
evidence have ‘any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence?’” 15 If she can answer affirmatively, then
that evidence has passed the first hurdle of relevance.
6

Paul W. Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Melissa M. O’Toole-Loureiro,
Authentication of Social Media Evidence, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 437
(2013).
7
PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT, SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE 2013 (Dec. 30,
2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/12/30/social-media-update-2013/#.
8
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited
Nov. 8, 2014).
9
See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. and World Population Clock, CENSUS.GOV
http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2014) (listing world
population of 7.21 billion people).
10
PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT, supra note 7.
11
Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 685 (Del. 2014).
12
Grimm, supra note 6, at 438.
13
Id.
14
FED. R. EVID. 402.
15
FED. R. EVID. 401(a).
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Any tangible or demonstrative exhibits must then be
authenticated in order to be relevant.16 The proponent offering the piece
of writing must produce evidence “sufficient to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is.”17 For an exhibit such as a social
media post, this would typically involve demonstrating that the writing
has a connection to a specific person, through authorship or some other
relation.18
It is easy to appreciate the importance of authentication when
considering a document such as a letter. Suppose an attorney offers a
letter at trial which she claims was written by the defendant. She declares
that the letter perfectly demonstrates the defendant’s state of mind at the
time he wrote it. This would be very persuasive to the jury. The
attorney’s assertion can only be true, however, if the defendant actually
did author the letter. If another person wrote it, then the jury has learned
nothing new about the defendant’s state of mind, and the letter is
irrelevant. Authentication ensures that before the jury hears any
evidence, the proponent has connected it to the trial in a way that ensures
the evidence is actually what she claims it to be.
In Rule 901, the Federal Rules of Evidence offer multiple ways
in which proponents can authenticate a particular item. The simplest
technique is providing testimony from a witness who has knowledge that
the evidence is what it claims to be.19 Another method involves pointing
to distinctive characteristics of the evidence that can authenticate the
item.20 For example, an email may state facts that only one person could
know, or use a language pattern known to match a particular person.21
The proponent may also demonstrate that the evidence was created by a
process or system which produces accurate results. 22 Thus, an X-ray
machine is assumed to create an authentic portrayal of the bones it has
scanned.23 These examples are not an exclusive list of authentication
methods.24 An attorney may use any number of methods to fulfill the
authentication requirement.
16

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 221 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 7th ed. 2014).
FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
18
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 16.
19
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1).
20
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
21
FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee’s note.
22
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
23
FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee’s note.
24
See id. (“The examples are not intended as an exclusive enumeration of
allowable methods but are meant to guide and suggest, leaving room for growth
and development in this area of the law.”).
17
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Preliminary questions about the admissibility of evidence are
decided by the trial judge.25 This means that the court’s role is to serve as
a “gatekeeper” in deciding whether the proponent has offered evidence
sufficient to meet the 901 authentication requirement.26 He does not need
to be satisfied that the evidence is actually what it purports to be,27 only
that it is reasonably possible for a jury to find that it is authentic.28 After
the court determines that the proponent has successfully met this
threshold requirement, it is for the trier-of-fact to appraise the credibility
and weight of the proffered evidence.29 The jury must decide whether the
item is what it seems to be.30

III. DETERMINING AUTHENTICITY OF SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE
The state of the law regarding social media evidence
admissibility is murky at best. Courts and academic writings have split
the case law into two approaches. These can best be referred to as “The
Maryland Approach” and “The Texas Approach.”31
According to analysts, Maryland Approach courts are skeptical
of social media evidence, finding the odds too great that someone other
than the alleged author of the evidence was the actual creator.32 The
proponent must therefore affirmatively disprove the existence of a
different creator in order for the evidence to be admissible.33
Courts following the Texas Approach are seen as more lenient in
determining what amount of evidence a “reasonable juror” would need to
be persuaded that the alleged creator did create the evidence. 34 The
burden of production then transfers to the objecting party to demonstrate

25

FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 2009).
27
United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
28
Vidacak, 553 F.3d at 349.
29
FED. R. EVID. 104.
30
In the event of a bench trial, the judge will act as trier-of-fact rather than a
jury.
31
I have adopted the terms “The Maryland Approach” and “The Texas
Approach,” first used in Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682 (Del. 2014), as convenient
titles for the two perceived methods.
32
Grimm, supra note 6, at 455.
33
Id.
34
See, e.g., United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014); State v. Assi,
No. 1 CA-CR 10-0900, 2012 WL 3580488 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2012);
People v. Valdez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628 (Ct. App. 2011); People v. Clevenstine,
891 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Manuel v. State, 357 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).
26
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that the evidence was created or manipulated by a third party.35 This
second approach is viewed as “better reasoned” because it allows for
proper interplay among the many rules that govern admissibility,
including 901.36

A. The Maryland Approach
This first approach’s seemingly higher standard for social media
authentication is best exemplified by the Maryland Court of Appeals’
decision in Griffin v. State.37 The defendant in Griffin was charged with
second-degree murder, first degree assault, and use of a handgun in
commission of a felony.38 The State offered printouts from a MySpace
profile belonging to the defendant’s girlfriend, Jessica Barber, to
demonstrate that Barber had allegedly threatened one of the State’s
witnesses.39 The page contained the statement: “FREE BOOZY [(the
nickname for the defendant)]!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET
STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!”40 The printout displayed
the name of the profile as “Sistahsouljah,” and described details of the
profile owner’s life such as a birthday of 10/02/1983 and location of Port
Deposit. 41 A photograph of Griffin and Barber embracing was also
included.42
Rather than using Barber to authenticate the pages, the State
attempted to use an investigator’s testimony.43 The lead investigator for
the case, Sergeant John Cook, downloaded the information from
MySpace.44 Cook testified that he knew it was Barber’s profile due to the
photograph of her and Boozy, a reference to the children, and her birth
date listed on the form.45 Defense counsel objected because “the State
could not sufficiently establish a ‘connection’ between the profile and
posting and Ms. Barber.”46 The printouts were admitted and Griffin was
convicted.

35

See Tienda, 538 S.W.3d at 642–47.
Grimm, supra note 6, at 456.
37
Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. App. 2011).
38
Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791, 794 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010).
39
Griffin, 19 A.3d at 418.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 348–50.
45
Id. at 418.
46
Id. at 348.
36
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Griffin appealed the decision, asserting that the printouts were
not properly authenticated and therefore inadmissible.47 The Maryland
Court of Special Appeals upheld the verdict. After another appeal
request, the Maryland Court of Appeals accepted the case to decide
whether the MySpace printout was representative of a profile created by
Barber, and also whether she had posted the “SNITCHES GET
STICHES” warning.48
The appellate court noted that very few courts in any jurisdiction
had an opportunity to consider the authentication of pages printed from a
social media site. 49 It stated that “[t]he potential for fabricating or
tampering with electronically stored information on a social networking
site” posed “significant challenges” when considering authenticity of site
printouts.50 The court nonetheless maintained that Rule 901 governed
authentication.51 This rule states that circumstantial evidence “such as
appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, location, or other
distinctive characteristics” can be offered as evidence that the article is
what it claims to be.52 The court reversed and remanded, holding that a
birthdate, location, reference to the defendant’s nickname, and a
photograph of the couple were not sufficiently “distinctive
characteristics” to authenticate a MySpace printout.53 When explaining
its decision, it cited a concern that “someone other than the alleged
author may have accessed the account and posted the message in
question.”54
In State v. Eleck, the defendant appealed his conviction of assault
in the first degree by means of a dangerous instrument.55 Eleck claimed
on appeal that the trial court improperly excluded evidence that had been
properly authenticated. 56 At a party with about twenty intoxicated
teenagers in attendance, the defendant engaged two party guests in a

47

Id. at 417.
Id. at 419–20.
49
Id. at 422.
50
Id.
51
Id. (citing the state law which is materially similar to Federal Rule of
Evidence 901).
52
Id. (emphasis added).
53
Id. at 423–24.
54
Id. at 423 (quoting Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791, 805 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2010)).
55
State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 819 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
56
Id.
48

40

AUTHENTICITY AND ADMISSIBILITY

[Vol. 14

physical altercation.57 When the combatants were separated, Eleck’s two
opponents both discovered that they had suffered stab wounds.58
At his trial, Eleck offered printouts of Facebook messages
allegedly received from a State’s witness, another attendant of the
party.59 The defendant personally testified as to the authenticity of the
printouts, stating that the user name belonged to the witness, the profile
contained photographs of the witness, and that he had downloaded and
printed the messages himself.60 The State’s witness admitted that the
profile was hers, but claimed that her account had been hacked and she
had not sent the messages in question.61
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision not to
admit the evidence, 62 determining that even unique user names and
passwords are not enough to eliminate the possibility of hackers.63 The
court explained that authenticating that a message came from a specific
account is not sufficient evidence that it was authored by the account
owner.64 The messages themselves did not “reflect distinct information
that only [the witness] would have possessed regarding the defendant or
the character of their relationship.” 65 The authorship had not been
sufficiently authenticated.
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Williams, an appellate court
found that the prosecution had failed to offer adequate foundation as to
the authorship of MySpace messages.66 In this case, the defendant was
convicted of murder in the first degree of one victim and assault with
intent to commit murder of another victim.67 At trial, the girlfriend of one
of the victims testified about MySpace messages she received from the
defendant’s brother, warning her not to testify at trial.68 The testimony
was admitted without objection, but the defendant later unsuccessfully
submitted motions to strike the testimony and declare a mistrial.69

57

Id.
Id.
59
Id. at 820.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 825.
63
Id. at 822.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 824.
66
Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1173 (Mass. 2010).
67
Id. at 1165.
68
Id. at 1172.
69
Id. at 1171.
58
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When reviewing the authentication issue, the appellate court
compared the MySpace messages to a phone call: “[A] witness’
testimony that he or she has received an incoming call from a person
claiming to be ‘A,’ without more, is insufficient evidence to admit the
call as a conversation with ‘A.’”70 Although the foundational testimony
had established that “the messages were sent by someone with access to
[the defendant’s] MySpace Web page,” there was no evidence regarding
“the person who actually sent the message.”71 The court referenced a
lack of evidence concerning how secure MySpace is, how a person
accesses the page, and whether passwords or codes are used.72 Allowing
the jury to hear this testimony would create a high potential for
prejudice, and the court ruled that the content of the messages should not
have been admitted.73

B. The Texas Approach
Many courts have followed what has been termed the more
lenient “Texas Approach.”74 This approach is best exemplified by Tienda
v. State. After being convicted of murder, Tienda appealed the decision,
claiming that the trial court should not have admitted evidence from
MySpace pages alleged to be managed by the defendant.75 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, as did the Court of
Criminal Appeals.76
The victim was traveling home from a nightclub when his car
unexpectedly came under gunfire from a caravan of three or four cars on
the same road.77 Tienda, the appellant, was a passenger in one of the
caravan’s cars. 78 The Court admitted several MySpace accounts into
evidence allegedly belonging to the appellant.79 Each account was linked
to email addresses including Tienda’s name or nickname, had a profile
name matching either Tienda’s name or nickname, listed Tienda’s
70

Id. at 1172 (citing Commonwealth v. Hartford, 194 N.E.2d 401 (Mass. 1963)).
Id. at 1172–73.
72
Id. at 1172.
73
Id. at 1173.
74
See, e.g., United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014); State v. Assi,
No. 1 CA-CR 10-0900, 2012 WL 3580488 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2012);
People v. Valdez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628 (Ct. App. 2011); People v. Clevenstine,
891 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Manuel v. State, 357 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).
75
Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 634.
76
Id. at 634.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 634–35.
71
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hometown as the location, and contained photographs of a man who
“resembled” Tienda.80 The accounts contained postings such as, “You
aint BLASTIN You aint Lastin”81 and “EVERYONE WUZ BUSTIN
AND THEY ONLY TOLD ON ME.”82
In affirming the intermediate appellate and trial courts, the Court
of Criminal Appeals compared the current case to Griffin, stating that
“there [were] far more circumstantial indicia of authenticity in this case
than in Griffin.” 83 The combination of photographs, references to
particular situations, and messages sent from accounts bearing the
appellant’s name—“taken as a whole with all of the individual particular
details considered in combination”—was deemed sufficient for a
reasonable jury to believe that Tienda created and maintained the
profiles.84
In People v. Clevenstine,85 the defendant was convicted of five
counts of rape and six other charges such as sexual abuse and
endangering the welfare of a child. 86 Clevenstine challenged that a
computer disk with MySpace and Facebook messages between him and
the victims had not been properly authenticated. 87 Both victims had
testified that the defendant had messaged them through social media
sites. 88 The State Police investigator had retrieved the conversations
directly from the victims’ hard drives.89 A legal compliance officer from
Facebook testified that the messages did originate from the purported
accounts.90 The defendant’s wife also testified that she had seen the same
sexually explicit messages on her husband’s MySpace account on their
home computer.91 While the court recognized that the defendant’s claim
that someone else accessed his MySpace account was possible, “the
likelihood of such a scenario presented a factual issue for the jury.”92

80

Id. at 634–36.
Id. at 635.
82
Id. at 636.
83
Id. at 647.
84
Id. at 645.
85
891 N.Y.D.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
86
Id. at 513.
87
Id. at 514.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
81
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IV. ARE THE TWO APPROACHES ACTUALLY DIFFERENT?
In just the past two years, the distinction between the Maryland
Approach and the Texas Approach has been widening. The most likely
source for the separation is Honorable Paul W. Grimm’s 2013 article,
Authentication of Social Media Evidence.93 In this American Journal of
Trial Advocacy article, Grimm clearly draws a line between what he sees
as two separate approaches to social media authentication. The first
approach involves courts setting “an unnecessarily high bar for the
admissibility of social media evidence.”94 The second utilizes a different
method, “determining the admissibility of social media evidence based
on whether there was sufficient evidence of authenticity for a reasonable
jury to conclude that the evidence was authentic.”95 This distinction has
been reiterated often in the past two years.
Courts and attorneys have cited directly to Grimm’s article in
case opinions and briefs. A 2014 case, Parker v. State,96 references the
article before separating past cases into “The Maryland Approach” and
“The Texas Approach.”97 It portrays Griffin and Tienda respectively as
the prime examples of each method,98 just as in Grimm’s article.99 The
appellee’s brief for Harris v. State,100 quotes Grimm’s article several
times when asserting that Griffin set an “unnecessarily high bar” for
authentication of social media evidence.101 The appellant’s brief in the
currently pending case, Sublet v. State,102 similarly references the article
while claiming that a court was “inappropriately strict” in its
interpretation of evidence law.103 In citing Grimm, judges and attorneys
are adopting the distinction between unnecessarily strict courts and those
that are more lenient.
The distinction is also being reinforced in secondary sources.
The Practical Law section of Westlaw informs litigators that most courts
93

Grimm, supra note 6.
Id. at 441.
95
Id.
96
85 A.3d 682 (Del. 2014).
97
Id.
98
See id. at 686 (stating that the higher standard for social media evidence “is
best exemplified by . . . Griffin v. State” and the “alternative line of cases” is
best represented by Tienda).
99
See Grimm, supra note 6, at 441, 449 (using Griffin and Tienda as the first
cases to describe each approach).
100
No. 42, slip op. (Md. Apr. 23, 2015).
101
Id. at *31.
102
No. 59 (Md. Apr. 23, 2015).
103
Id. at *24 n.20.
94
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employ a practice of admitting evidence “if the party demonstrates to the
trial judge that a jury could reasonably find that the proffered evidence is
authentic.”104 It then explains that other courts recommend a “higher
standard.” 105 It once again provides Tienda and Griffin as the two
paradigms. 106 Another 2014 article, The Pitfalls and Perils of Social
Media in Litigation, compares more lenient cases to those in which a
“greater degree of authentication” is required.107
Dividing the case law into two such distinct categories ignores
the similar reasoning behind the courts’ decisions and fails to take into
account rules that govern admissibility other than those in the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
The state of case law as it pertains to social media evidence has
evolved considerably in the past decade and a half. In 1999, one court
deciding whether to admit printouts of a webpage declared, “There is no
way Plaintiff can overcome the presumption that the information he
discovered on the Internet is inherently untrustworthy. . . . [A]ny
evidence procured off the Internet is adequate for almost nothing.”108
While courts sometimes still display a distrust of social media
evidence,109 they no longer discount it as completely useless. Courts and
legal scholars have generally agreed that although rapidly developing
technology may present new challenges, the existing rules of evidence
regarding authenticity are “adequate to the task.”110
Social media evidence is most often offered as evidence at trial
as printouts of webpages. Determining admissibility of these printouts
involves two steps: (1) “Printouts of web pages must first be
104

Norman C. Simon & Samantha V. Ettari, Social Media: What Every Litigator
Needs to Know, PRACTICAL LAW, (to access this article, log in to Westlaw Next;
follow “Practical Law”; follow “Litigation”; search for “social media” in search
bar; follow hyperlink for appropriate article) (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
PAUL RAGUSA & LAUREN EMERSON, THE PITFALLS AND PERILS OF SOCIAL
MEDIA IN LITIGATION (2014), available at Westlaw 2014 WL 5465789.
108
St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774–75
(S.D. Tex. 1999) (emphasis added).
109
See, e.g., People v. Beckley, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 366–67 (Ct. App. 2010)
(stating that even unskilled, inexperienced users can utilize Photoshop to change
photographs to produce false pictures) and State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822
(Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (stating that “electronic communication . . . could be
generated by someone other than the named sender”).
110
Steven Good, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1, 7
(Fall 2009).
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authenticated as accurately reflecting the content and image of a specific
webpage on the computer,” and then (2) in order to be relevant, the
printout “must be authenticated as having been posted by that source.”111
The judge acts as a gatekeeper in determining whether the party offering
the evidence has fulfilled this requirement of relevance.112
The cases listed as following the Maryland Approach are
examples of proponents fulfilling the first requirement, but failing to
satisfy or even address the second. These courts are not holding social
media evidence to a higher standard than any other; they are recognizing
that an important condition for admissibility has not been met.
The clearest example of this is the case listed as the exemplar
Maryland Approach case, Griffin v. State. The oft-quoted holding states:
The potential for abuse and manipulation of a social networking site
by someone other than its purported creator and/or user leads to our
conclusion that a printout of an image from such a site requires a
greater degree of authentication than merely identifying the date of
birth of the creator and her visage in a photograph on the site in
order to reflect that [the purported creator] was its creator and the
author of the [relevant] language.113

While Grimm seems to focus on the first half of this statement,
attributing the court’s holding to an overly suspicious view of social
media content, it is actually the second half that explains the decision.
While an investigator’s testimony demonstrated that the printouts were in
fact downloaded from MySpace, the State failed to connect the
statements to the purported creator. Unless they were posted by the
alleged source, the warnings were not relevant to the case. The appellate
court therefore correctly concluded that the printouts had been
improperly admitted during the trial.
Tienda v. State, often presented in articles and opinions as the
opposite of Griffin, explicitly compared its own situation to that of the
Maryland case.114 It held that a greater amount of circumstantial evidence
supported a finding that “the MySpace pages belonged to the appellant
and that he created and maintained them.”115 The difference between
Griffin and Tienda was not a heightened admissibility standard. The
difference was that only in the latter case did the advocate both
111

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 16, at § 227.
FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
113
Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 424 (Md. App. 2011).
114
Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
115
Id. at 645 (emphasis added).
112
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authenticate the webpage and connect that page to the purported
author/maintainer.
This failure to show authorship also occurred in State v. Eleck.
The State’s witness acknowledged that the Facebook account was hers.116
This sufficiently authenticated the printout as representative of her
account. The State could not, however, show that she sent the messages.
The witness asserted that her account had been hacked,117 and the court
concluded that there was nothing inherent in the messages that identified
her as the author.118 Because the State was not able to authenticate the
messages as being connected to the purported source, the MySpace
statements were not relevant to the case and therefore inadmissible as
evidence.
Similarly, MySpace messages offered in Commonwealth v.
Williams were also ruled inadmissible. The court acknowledged the twoprong requirement for admitting communications by comparing the web
messages to a phone call. A witness can state that she had a conversation,
but for that conversation to be relevant it still must be shown that it was
with the purported other person. The court found that although the
foundational testimony had established that the person who sent the
messages had access to the webpage, there was no evidence of who that
person actually was. The court did not subscribe to any standard higher
than that required of other evidence. The proponent simply failed to
fulfill the requirements for admitting webpage printouts.
People v. Clavenstine is a case comparable to Williams while
still following the more lenient Texas Approach. Here, the proponent
offered MySpace messages taken directly from the victims’ hard
drives, 119 fulfilling the first requirement. The defendant’s wife also
testified that she had seen the messages on her husband’s computer.120
The messages were appropriately connected not only to the account, but
also to the author himself. With both requirements satisfied, the evidence
was admitted.
Numerous other cases that seemingly follow the Maryland
Approach share this same element of failing to demonstrate connection
to the purported author. In Commonwealth v. Wallick,121 the proponent
authenticated a photograph as coming from a MySpace page, but failed
116
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to show who created/maintained the page.122 An expert in People v.
Beckley testified that a MySpace photograph was not forged, but no
evidence was offered that the picture was what it purported to be—a girl
flashing an alleged gang sign.123 Even if the court in United States v.
Jackson agreed that postings about white supremacist groups did appear
on the web, it still noted a lack of evidence regarding whether the posts
actually were posted by the groups.124

CONCLUSION
Courts using the Maryland Approach are not placing an
excessively high bar on social media evidence, or even following a
stricter standard than the Texas Approach cases. They are simply
recognizing that evidence must be relevant before it may be presented to
the jury. In the case of website printouts, this means showing that the
content reflects a certain webpage and that it was posted by the purported
source. Opinions and articles drawing a distinct line between “Maryland”
and “Texas” approaches are actually just pointing out the cases in which
the second requirement was not fulfilled. Viewing the differing opinions
as two opposite approaches not only creates an artificial distinction, but
also increases the probability that future courts will misinterpret the
admissibility standards and create an actual divergence in analysis.
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